Social norms and household time allocation by Fernandez, Cristina & Sevilla-Sanz, Almudena
 
 








































IESE Business School – University of Navarra 
Avda. Pearson, 21 – 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Tel.: (+34) 93 253 42 00 Fax: (+34) 93 253 43 43 
Camino del Cerro del Águila, 3 (Ctra. de Castilla, km 5,180) – 28023 Madrid, Spain. Tel.: (+34) 91 357 08 09 Fax: (+34) 91 357 29 13 
 
Copyright © 2006 IESE Business School. 
Working Paper
WP no 648 
September, 2006  SP-SP 
 































The Public-Private Center is a Research Center based at IESE Business School. Its mission is to 
develop research that analyses the relationships between the private and public sectors 
primarily in two areas: regulatory (the effects of regulation on private economic activity) and 
contractual (the total or partial transfer of public services to the private sector). Research 
results are disseminated through publications, conferences and colloquia. These activities are 
aimed to foster cooperation between the private sector and public administrations, as well as 
the exchange of ideas and initiatives.  
The sponsors of the SP-SP Center are the following:  
• Accenture 
•  Ajuntament de Barcelona 
•  Official Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Navigation of Barcelona 
• BBVA 
•  Diputació de Barcelona 
• ENDESA 
•  Garrigues, Abogados y Asesores Tributarios 
•  Catalan Government (Generalitat de Catalunya) 




The content of this publication reflects the conclusions and findings of the individual authors, 
and not the opinions of the Center’s sponsors.  
 











Economic theories of the household predict that increases in female relative human capital lead to 
decreases in female housework time. However, longitudinal and cross-sectional evidence seems to 
contradict this implication. Women's share of home time fails to decrease despite increases in 
women's relative earnings. The literature has proposed social norms on the household division of 
labor as an alternative explanation. We use the 2002-03 Spanish Time Use Survey (STUS) to 
explore the presence of social norms associated to the household division of housework and 
childcare. First, we observe that wives that earn more than their husbands still undertake more 
than 50% of housework and childcare. Second, we find that a woman's relative share of 
housework decreases as her relative earnings increase, but only up to the point when she earns 
the same as her husband. Finally, independently of the definition of childcare, the relative time 
devoted to childcare does not vary with spouses' relative earnings. All these findings suggest that 
social norms might be an important factor in the division of household time. 
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SOCIAL NORMS AND HOUSEHOLD TIME ALLOCATION* 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Comparative advantage and bargaining theories of the household predict a more egalitarian 
allocation of time within the household as female human capital increases. In the comparative 
advantage framework specialization is efficient, and the spouse with the lowest opportunity 
cost (i.e. the lowest human capital or the highest home productivity) contributes the most to 
household production and the least to market work (Becker, 1991). Bargaining theories reach 
the same conclusion but are based on the concept of threat points determined by either the cost 
of filling out of marriage (McElroy and Horney, 1981) or of a non-cooperative marriage 
(Lundberg and Pollak, 1993).
1 
However, longitudinal and cross-sectional evidence seem to suggest that women's share of 
home time fails to decrease despite increases in women's earnings. At the longitudinal level 
there is vast evidence from time-use surveys that despite the increase in female labor force 
participation, time devoted to housework by men has changed very little in the last decades, 
and thus specialization within the household has remained fairly unchanged (Aguiar and Hurst, 
2006). At the cross-sectional level Hochsehild and Machung (1989) first showed some 
qualitative evidence pointing to the fact that when a wife works more hours than her husband 
outside the home, she still undertakes a larger share of housework. In the same vein Akerlof 
and Kranton (2000) corroborate Hochsehild findings using PSID data. 
Traditional theories of the household can explain the evidence above by assuming either that, 
women have a higher comparative advantage in household production or that women derive a 
higher utility from housework. However under these assumptions we would not be able to 
explain the empirical regularity that women with higher earnings than their husbands do not 
only do relatively more housework than them (as in Akerlof and Kranton's findings), but also 
do relatively more housework than women whose earnings are lower than their husbands. In 
fact empirical findings for the US and Australia suggest that a woman's relative share of 
                                              
*The authors are greateful to Daniel Hamermesh and Manuel F. Bagues for their comments. We are also thankful to 
participants at the Joint Empirical Social Science Semminar at ISER, participants at the 2006 IZA-SOLE Transatlantic 
Meetings of Labor Economists and participants at the 2006 ESPE Congress in Verona. Remaining errors are of our 
exclusive responsibility. 
1 Chiappori (1992) and Browning and Chiappori (1997) unified both set of theories into a "collective" approach to the 
household, where efficiency in the household maximization problem is secured due to spousal transfers of private 
consumption. 
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housework decreases as her relative earnings go up, but only up to the point when she 
contributes the same as her husband to the family income. When her contribution to the total 
household income goes beyond fifty percent, her housework share increases as her earnings go 
up (Brines, 1994), (Greenstein, 2000), (Gupta, 1999), and (Bittman et al., 2001). 
Social scientists have turned to social norms to explain these empirical regularities.
2 Akerlof 
and Kranton suggest an economic model of identity to explain why women undertake a greater 
share of housework than their husbands even when they work more hours and have higher 
earnings than them. In their model a husband looses identity when his wife earns more than 
him because of the prescription held by most men that they should earn more than their wives. 
Equality in utility is restored when the wife undertakes more housework than her husband 
given the prescription that men should not do women's work at home. In a similar fashion the 
sociological literature argues that when men earn less than their wives a gender norm violation 
occurs, thus either, the wife, the husband or both move to more traditional behavior in the 
realm of housework in order to neutralize this deviance. This would explain why women that 
earn more than their husbands not only devote more time to household chores than them, but 
also do relatively more housework than women who earn less than their husbands. This 
neutralization effect is what has been called in the literature doing gender. 
The 2002-2003 Spanish Time Use Survey (STUS) is used in this paper to explore the presence of 
social norms associated to the household division of labor. We extend previous studies by not 
only looking at how husband and wife allocate their time to household chores (or housework), 
but also the household division of childcare time. Spain is the perfect example to use in this 
context as it is a country where gender roles are deeply entrenched.
3 The STUS has two main 
advantages over other time use data sets. First it is diary data, i.e. individuals record each 
activity during the 144 ten-minute interval of the day. A vast amount of evidence support the 
reliability of diary information over ex-post stylized questions on total time spent in any given 
activity (Juster and Stafford, 1991). Second, the STUS is advantageous over other diary surveys 
such as the American time use diary survey because it not only contains diary information on 
the respondent but also on the spouse. This piece of information is crucial for the construction 
of a measure of specialization within the household. 
We find support for the notion of social norms upon the division of housework the way that 
has been characterized in the literature. First, similar to Akerlof and Kranton, we observe a high 
level of specialization within the household, with women that earn more than their husbands 
still undertaking about 70% of all housework and childcare. Second, we find that a woman's 
relative share of housework decreases as her relative earnings increase only up to the point 
when she earns the same as her husband, but then it remains constant. Finally, we use detailed 
description of childcare activities in the diary data to help us conceptualize childcare time. 
Detailed diary data allow us to distinguish between childcare that might be conceptualized as 
housework (either because it can be easily outsourced or no direct utility is derived in the 
margin) and childcare conceptually closer to leisure. We find that, independently of the 
definition of childcare, the relative time devoted to childcare does not vary with spouses' 
                                              
2 Although highly interesting, the formation and enforcement of social norms is beyond the scope of this paper. See 
Burda et al. (2006) for the use of social norms regarding the coordination of leisure activities to explain the fact that 
men and women total paid and unpaid work hours are the same over time and across countries. 
3 For example, Alvarez and Miles show that the unequal allocation of household time in two earners Spanish couples 
persists after observable characteristics are taken into account (Alvarez and Miles, 2003).  
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relative earnings. All these findings seem to contradict traditional theories of the household and 
suggest that social norms might be at the root of division of household time. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set used in the analysis. Section 3 
specifies the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses 
alternative interpretations to our findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. 2002-2003 Spanish Time Use Survey (STUS) 
The data used for the empirical analysis is drawn from the 2002-2003 Spanish Time Use 
Survey. The STUS is part of the Harmonized European Time Use Surveys (HETUS) launched by 
the EU Statistics Office (Eurostat). It consists of a representative sample of 20,603 households 
and contains information on daily activities by means of the completion of a personal diary 
and household and individual questionnaires. The sample is evenly distributed over the year 
and the week in order to accurately represent time use patterns during all the days of the week. 
The instrument of the survey is based upon a diary of activities, where all members of the 
household, 10 years old and over complete on a selected day (the same day for all members of 
the household). An extensive literature confirms the reliability and validity of diary data and its 
superiority over other time-use surveys based on stylized questions, which ask respondents to 
estimate time in activities on a "typical day" (Robinson, 1985) and (Juster and Stafford, 1991). 
The diaries time frame is 24 consecutive hours (from 6:00 a.m. in the morning until 6:00 a.m. 
the following day) and is divided into 10 minute intervals. In each of the intervals, the 
respondent records a main activity and a secondary activity (carried out simultaneously with 
the primary activity), whether the activity was performed in the company of a child under 
10 years old, another member of the household or another adult, and the location where the 
activity took place.
4 Activities are coded according to a harmonized list of activities established 
by Eurostat and are grouped into 10 major categories: personal care, work, studies, household 
and family, volunteer work and meetings, social life and recreation, sports and open air 
activities, hobbies and games, means of communication, and non-specified travel and use of 
time. The STUS proves particularly useful for our study since, unlike other recent diary-based 
time use surveys like the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), the STUS contains information on 
time devoted to household production by both spouses. This information is crucial when the 
variable of interest is specialization within the household. 
Due to the novelty of this data set, Table 1 presents a comparison between the Spanish Time 
Use Survey and the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA), a well-known representative panel data 
set of the Spanish labor market. The main demographic and economic variables in both data 
sets resemble each other, although the education distribution is somewhat different between the 
two surveys. However, labor indicators are remarkably similar in both data sets which suggests 
that the disparity in education is likely to be due to a different classification method rather than 
inherent differences in educational achievement. 
 
                                              
4 Unlike the ATUS, which is a recall diary constructed for each respondent by a telephone interviewer who asks what 
the respondent was doing yesterday at 4:00 am, how long the activity lasted, who was there, and where the activity 
took place, continuing through the day for 24 hours, HETUS surveys are leave behind written diaries, which may be 
of higher quality but which are more costly to collect (Juster, 1985).  
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Table 1 
Comparison of EPA and Spanish TUS 
     EPA      Time  Use 
   Both Men  Women  Both  Men  Women 
Sex   100  48.56  5.14  100  48.66  51.34 
Age Groups 
  from 16 to 19  5.43 5.73  5.14  5.55  5.68  5.42 
  from 20 to 24  8.43  8.86  8.02  8.46  8.91  8.03 
  from 25 to 29  10.08  10.58  9.62  10.58  11.12  10.08 
  from 30 to 34  10.13  10.63  9.66  9.75  10.26  9.27 
  from 35 to 39  9.75  10.15  9.37  9.94  10.23  9.66 
  from 40 to 44  8.94  9.22  8.68  8.95  9,18  8.74 
  from 45 to 49  7.85  8.04  7.67  7.95  8.23  7.70 
  from 50 to 54  7.09  7.22  6.97  7.13  7.20  7.07 
  from 55 to 59  6.65  6.68  6.61  6.54  6.62  6.46 
  from 60 to 64  5.56  5.49  5.63  5.59  5.43  5.74 
  from 65 to 69  5.86  5.44  6.25  6.43  6.09  6.76 
  more than 70  14.22  11.95  16.37  13.12  11.05  15.07 
Marital Status 
 Single  31.05  35.19 27.15 30.27  33.76  26.96 
 Married  58.61  60.32 57.00 59.55  61.39  57.80 
 Widow  7.58  2.54 12.33  7.28  2.54  11.77 
 Divorced  2.76  1.96  3.52  2.91  2.32  3.47 
Education Level 
 No  Education  2.94  1.88  3.93  2.69  1.61  3.72 
 Primary  Education  35.61  33.31 37.79 28.61  26.53  30.57 
  Secondary Education (1
st. stage)  25.04  27.10  23.09  30.37  31.56  29.25 
  Secondary Education (2nd. stage)  16.86  17.25  16.50  17.04  17.95  16.17 
  Secondary Education (2nd. stage) plus professional training  0.11  0.12  0.10  6.53  7.51  5.61 
 College  19.19  20.01 18.43 14.29  14.18  14.41 
 PhD  0.24  0.32  0.17  0.46  0.65  0.27 
Employment Status 
 Labor  Force  Participation  54.87  67.28 43.15 56.19  68.53  44.49 
 Unemployment  11.12  7.95 15.79 10.43  7.48  14.73 
Note: values are in percentage terms. 
 
2.1. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
The survey contains information on 60,493 respondents, of which 22.68% are children under 
10 years old, and 20,603 households. For the empirical analysis in Section 4 we restrict the 
sample to those individuals between 20 and 65 who are married (8,876 couples). We restrict our 
analysis to those households where both spouses report positive earnings (3,504 households).
5 
Including one-earner couples is problematic because the processes governing household 
decisions are understandably different in the two samples. This suggests that we should not 
combine one and two-earner households in the same regressions. More importantly we can 
offer no useful exclusion restrictions to impute missing earnings for those women out of the 
labor force, since everything that might be used to impute wages already appears in our time 
use regressions. Households where both spouses work fulltime, (3,314 households) have been 
considered.
6 Finally, in order to get a clear representation of time use, the sample has been 
                                              
5 This is a 39 percent of the sample, which is consistent with the Spanish Employment Survey both partners work in 
34 percent of households. 
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restricted to those households where both spouses report a usual day as in Bonke (Bonke et al., 
2005).
7 All these restrictions leave the sample in 2,532 households. In those regressions where a 
form of childcare is the dependent variable we restrict the sample to those households with a 
child under 10 present, a total of 976 households. For the sake of consistency we present results 
only for those households for which we have information on all the variables for both spouses. 
This leaves us with 2,008 households for all the sample, and 736 households for the sample 
with children under 10. 
Table 2 presents some summary statistics of the relevant socioeconomic variables used in the 
empirical analysis for the total sample and the sample of parents with children under 10. The 
average age difference between spouses is two years, with men being 42 years old and women 
40 years old on average. The average number of children living in the household is around 
1.37, which is very similar to the Spanish total fertility rate.
8 About 40% of the households in 
our sample have children between 5 and 14 years old and about 25% of households report 
having children less or equal than four years of age (this is almost 50% of the sample when 
only households with children are considered). Following De la Fuente and Jimeno (2005) we 
translate the ten educational categories provided in the survey into a variable that measures 
years of completed education.
9 Although education is distributed almost evenly between men 
and women, with women slightly more educated, men tend to work about five hours more than 
women per week. The Spanish Time Use data does not contain information on hourly wages, 
but rather net monthly earnings. Net monthly earnings, as well as family income, are reported 
as a scale rather than as a continuous variable. We see that almost 60% of women have net 
monthly earnings under 1000 euros, whereas the distribution IS more disperse for men. 
Although women are slightly more educated than men only 4.5% of women versus 10% of men 
report net monthly earnings above 2000 euros. Household income measures total household 
income per month. It includes labor as well as non-labor income such as dividends or transfers. 
We have divided it into three categories: below 1500 euros, between 1500 and 3000 and higher 
than 3000 euros. Thus, the majority of households (about 60%) fall in the intermediate 
category, with about 20% falling in the other two categories, as observed. 
                                              
7 Individuals report the day as not being usual if it is not a usual day or work or study, meaning that they are either 
on holiday, on sick leave or not at work for some other reason. Results are robust to including these households 
(upon request). 
8 Although we only have information on children living in the household, the fact that children leave the parental 
home at a late age in Spain makes this variable a closer approximation to the actual number of children. 
Furthermore, the variable of interest for our analysis is the presence of children in the household, rather than the 
total number of children. 
9 Five years of education if the respondent reports primary studies or lower, eight years of education if the 
respondent reports a EGB degree, ten years of education if the respondent reports a FPI degree, twelve years of 
education if the respondent reports a BUP degree, 13 years of education if the respondent reports a FPII degree, 
15 years of education if the respondent reports a Diplomatum or a 3 year university degree and 17 years of 
education if the respondent reports a Licenciatura or a 5 year university degree.  
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Table 2 
Summary statistics. Socioeconomic Variables 
  All sample  Sample of` parents <10 
Demographic and Economic Variables  Husband  Wife  Husband  Wife 
  Age  41.88 39.68  38.04  36.03 
   (8.85) (8.39)  (5.63)  (4.98) 
  Completed years of study  10.69  11.07  11.41  11.91 
   (3.78) (3.86)  (3.78)  (3.77) 
  Usual weekly hours of work  39.80  37.40  39.63  37.20 
   (2.17) (2.83)  (2.05)  (2.68) 
  Earnings less than 500 € 2.97%  16.63%  2.73%  14.61% 
  Earnings between 500 and 999.99 € 29.60%  43.35%  27.99%  44.41% 
  Earnings between 1000 and 1499.99 € 42.64%  25.89%  44.36%  25.45% 
  Earnings between 1500 and 1999.99 € 14.67%  9.56%  15.10%  11.04% 
  Earnings between 2000 and 2499.99 € 5.42%  3.12%  4.38%  2.65% 
  Earnings between 2500 and 2999.99 € 1.97%  0.58%  2.09%  0.95% 
  Earnings above 3000 € 2.71%  0.87%  3.36%  0.88% 
  Household income under 1500 € 17.28%  19.00% 
  Household income between 1500 and 3000 € 60.25%  60.79% 
  Household income above 3000 € 22.47%  0.20 
  No. of children  1.37  1.75 
   (0.97) (0.75) 
  No. of children 0-2  98.70%  23.82% 
  No. of children 2-4  14.45%  38.79% 
  No. of children 5-14  38.98%  67.57% 
  No. of children + 15 (men)  24.38%  6.12% 
  No. of children + 15 (women)  24.21%  6.36% 
 Household  members  3.47  3.81 
   (1.01) (0.82) 
Observations  2,008 736 
 
Table 3 shows the time devoted to different housework activities. Our housework variable is 
reported in daily minutes and includes time devoted to cooking, cleaning, mending and 
maintenance of clothes, gardening and pets, household maintenance and repairs, shopping, and 
household management. We have also included any travel time needed to undertake any of 
these activities (for example, we record as shopping any time spent driving to the supermarket). 
Appendix A presents a full description of activities in each category, which follows the HETUS 
classification. Table 3 depicts a clear pattern of specialization within the household. The 
majority of women (99.15%) undertake some housework activity vs. 77.63% of men. Women 
spend 215 minutes per day on housework whereas men spend 87 minutes. Thus, women spend 
almost three times more time in household chores than men. Specialization within the 
household is not only apparent with respect to total time, but also with respect to the type of 
activity. Consistent with other studies, women concentrate on routine and more time intensive 
housework, such as cooking and cleaning, whereas men are more active in sporadic and less 
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Table 3 
Daily minutes devoted to housework (all sample) 
    Husbands   Wives 
    % Mean  Mean % Mean  Mean 
      (fraction who  (whole    (fraction who  (whole 
     report  sample)    report sample) 
Housework time (minutes per day)    time>0)      time>0) 
  
Total  Housework  77.63%  111.72  86.73 99.15% 216.77 214.93 
  Cooking  61.57%  46.50 28.63  94.37% 94.43 89.11 
  Cleaning  37.16%  49.68 18.46  82.99% 72.19 59.91 
  Laundry  4.79%  33.67  1.61  46.47% 52.79 24.53 
  Gardening and Pets  11.77%  81.33  9.57  7.84%  48.52  3.80 
  Maintenance and Repairs  7.29%  67.23  4.90  2.30%  58.33  1.34 
  Shopping  29.88%  76.48 22.85  49.83% 71.93 35.84 
 Household  Management  1.90%  36.31  0.69  0.95%  40.96  0.39 
 
Observations     2,008    2,008 
 
Table 4 reports daily minutes of housework and different measures of childcare time for the sub 
sample of households where a child under 10 years of age is present. We first define childcare 1 
as all childcare reported as a primary activity. The variable childcare 1 measures time devoted 
to childcare activities during the designated day (dressing them up, helping them to eat, playing 
with them, taking them to school, etc.) as long as it is reported as a primary activity. We then 
construct  childcare 2, which includes childcare reported as both primary and secondary 
activity.
10 The latter refers to childcare mentioned in response to the query "Where you doing 
anything else?" (e.g., cooking dinner but also helping a child with homework). According to 
either measure women tend to spend more time in childcare activities than men, although the 
difference between genders are smaller than in the case of housework. On average women 
spend between 129 and 143 minutes on childcare 1 and childcare 2 respectively, whereas men 
devote 72 and 82 minutes per day respectively. Following Bianchi (2000) a third definition of 
childcare (childcare 3) uses information on whether a 10-year old child or younger was present 
while doing the main diary activity. This variable adds to childcare 2 any other time that the 
respondent spends with children and that has not been recorded as childcare in either the 
primary or the secondary activity (in order not to doublecount). Childcare 3 is closer to what 
has been called in the literature passive care, which is less likely to be categorized as leisure 
(Folbre et al., 2004). Table B1 in Appendix B shows what types of activities men and women do 
when a child less than 10 years old is present. Consistent with other time use surveys the type 
of activities women do when a child is present are housework, personal care and travel, 
whereas men tend to watch TV, do sports or socialize when a child is present. The absolute 
difference between wives and husbands increases to 100 minutes once this definition of 
childcare is introduced. Women spend 365 minutes with children under 10 whereas men spend 
252 minutes on average. 
 
                                              
10 The literature has found that in certain time use surveys childcare reported as primary activity significantly 
underreports total childcare time (Bianchi et al., 2006) and (Folbre et al., 2004). This however does not seem to be a 
crucial problem in the STUS, likely because the response rate for secondary activities is relatively low in the STUS 
compared to other time use surveys. 
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Table 4 
Daily minutes devoted to housework and childcare (sample of parents) 
     Husbands      Wives 
    %  Mean  Mean  %  Mean  Mean 
      (fraction (whole    (fraction (whole 
      who  report  sample)    who  report  sample) 
Housework time (minutes per day)    time>0)      time>0) 
 
 Total  Housework  80.48%  105.10  84.58  98.86%  204.82 202.48 
  Cooking  67.68%  46.67  31.59  93.82%  90.44  84.85 
  Cleaning  37.06%  53.65  19.88  81.85%  70.83  57.98 
  Laundry  6.37%  25.25  1.61  47.84%  50.42  24.12 
  Gardening  and  Pets  7.99%  69.74  5.57  5.25%  48.90  2.57 
  Maintenance  and  Repairs  6.67%  63.48  4.23  2.77%  37.41  1.04 
  Shopping  29.76%  70.57  21.00  45.97%  68.87  31.66 




 Childcare  1  71.70%  100.71  72.21  90.04%  142.29 128.12 
 Childcare  2  73.14%  112.05  81.95  91.11%  156.76 142.82 
 Childcare  3  91.97%  274.00  252.00  97.40%  374.27 364.54 
 
Observations   736      736 
  
Table 5 presents some indicators of household technology as well as of incidence of housework 
outsourcing. We can also see that almost all households have a microwave, a washing machine 
and a fridge. However, only about half have a dishwasher and about 25% have a dryer or an 
independent freezer. The commonly outsourced household activities are cooking and cleaning, 
with a percentage of 7% and 19% respectively.
11 Other activities that are outsourced are 
shopping and clothes repair, with about 4% of households outsourcing these services. 
(percentages are a little bit higher for households with children under 10). Of all households 
20% report having a housekeeper, this percentage being 25% among households with children 
under 10. About 40% of households with children under 10 report some sort of childcare 
outsourcing. In turn, household outsourcing levels in those activities where women spend the 
majority of time (apart from childcare) are relatively low, which stresses the importance of 









                                              
11 The question is whether the person being interviewed received any outside help in the last four weeks, where 
outside help is defined as help from a person, and not from a company or the public administration. This might 
explain low reported outsourcing levels for some activities such as repairs or maintenance. 
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Table 5 
Household technology and outsourcing indicators 
     Parents  of 




 Microwave  84.57%  86.08% 
 Dishwasher  53.62%  58.14% 
 Washing  machine  99.36%  99.82% 
 Dryer  26.94%  32.25% 
 Fridge  99.32%  99.71% 




 Meal  preparation  6.59%  9.82% 
 Household  Maintenance  18.86%  23.77% 
 Clothes  4.32%  5.87% 
  Gardening and pets  0.99%  1.12% 
 Repairs  1.74%  1.89% 
 Household  shopping  2.67%  3.43% 
 Household  management  1.35%  1.58% 
 Childcare  22.54%  56.24% 
 Paid  housekeeper  20.22%  29.30% 
 
Observations 2,008  736 
 
3. Empirical Specification 
The goal of this paper is to estimate to what extent household specialization is driven by the 
spouses' relative earnings, i.e. by the specialization or the bargaining effect, or by social norms. 
To do so we use the following specification: 
hiκ = wi0κ ß0κ  + wi1κ ß1κ  + Xiκγκ + εiκ            (1) 
The dependent variable is the degree of specialization measured by the wife's share of 






HH i m if
=
+
for Hi,f  and Hi,m the wife and the husband's housework time in activity κ. In 
the analysis in Section 4 we report weighted Tobit estimators and perform the analysis 
separately for housework and childcare. A Tobit specification is preferable given that there are 
a lot of men that report zero time in housework and thus this ratio is truncated at value 1.
12 
The coefficients of interest are ß0 and ßl, where  0 i w  is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if 
spouses have the same monthly earnings and 0 otherwise and  1 i w  is an indicator variable that 
takes value 1 if the wife's earnings are greater than the husband's and 0 otherwise. Thus the 
comparison category is the case when a husband earns more than his wife. The STUS does not 
contain information on hourly wages, so we use net monthly earnings instead. Using earnings 
in the right hand side is problematic since hours of work are jointly determined with hours of 
                                              
12 Weighted OLS did not significantly change the results (available upon request).  
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housework. We account for this potential bias by reducing the sample to those couples where 
both partners work full-time.
13 
Given any household activity κ, traditional models of the household and social norm theories 
would predict that ß0k and ß1k, are both negative, i.e. the relative share of time devoted to 
activity κ decreases as relative earnings increase. However, social norm theories predict that a 
woman's share of time in activity κ fails to decrease or even increases once a certain level of 
female relative earnings has been achieved, i.e. |ß0κ|  ≥ |ß1κ|. In other words, whereas 
traditional theories of the household predict that a woman's relative share of housework 
decreases with her relative earnings so that |ß0κ|  ≤ |ß1κ|, social norm theories predict that 
higher relative earning women perform an equal or higher share of household chores than 
lower relative earning women. Section 4 tests this prediction for the case of housework and 
childcare time. 
Because we are interested in the presence of social norms, net of the household optimization 
process (i.e. net of specialization and bargaining effects), the variables in Xi include the usual 
household and individual variables to account for bargaining and specialization factors within 
the household such as income and completed years of education. We present several 
specifications of equation (1). We also control for individual and household heterogeneity in 
the production of household services and preferences. We include household composition 
(number of people in the household and the presence of children in different age ranges), the 
number of rooms in the house, the presence of a microwave and other devices that might affect 
spouses' productivity in household goods and whether the household receives any external help 
(paid or unpaid) in the provision of household services. In some of our specifications we also 
include regional dummies. We also control for cohort specific heterogeneity by including 
spouses' ages. All the specifications include an indicator variable that takes value one if the 
interview took place during a week-day (Monday through Friday). 
4. Empirical Results 
This section estimates Equation 1 to test the presence of social norms on the household division 
of labor for the case of housework and childcare. 
4.1. Social Norms and the Division of Housework 
Table 6 shows some preliminary but already surprising results with respect to how the time that 
both spouses devote to housework and paid work changes with respect to spouses' relative 
earnings. I.e. when a wife's relative earnings are higher, equal and lower than her husband's. It 
also shows the variation in household specialization, defined as the time the woman spends in 
any housework over the total amount of time that both spouses spend in that activity. 
Housework is defined as the sum of the time devoted to cooking, cleaning, mending and 
maintenance of clothes, gardening and pets, household maintenance and repairs, shopping, and 
household management and any travel time associated with these activities. First, similar to 
PSID evidence, even women contributing to more than 50% of the household income engage in 
more than 50% of household production. On average, a woman's share of total housework time 
is .76 when she earns less than her husbands, .71 when she earns the same and .68 when she 
                                              
13 This is not a very strong restriction for the case of Spain where part time work is not widely extended. Results are 
robust to include all two earner couples (upon request).  
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earns more. This figure is very similar to Akerlof and Kranton's figure from the PSID, where 
wives earning the same as their husbands still perform about 70% of the housework. This would 
be consistent with traditional models of the household if we assume that women have either 
higher productivity or higher tastes for housework than men. However, even under this 
assumption it would not necessarily follow why the rate at which a woman's relative share of 
housework decreases is lower as her relative earnings increase. In fact women devote less time 
to housework activities as her relative earnings increase: 229 minutes when they earn less, 204 
when they earn the same and 189 when they earn more. However, men's housework time 
increases from 82 to 92 minutes as women's earnings increase but decrease again to 87 minutes 
when women earnings increase beyond men's earnings. Thus, as is found in longitudinal 
studies, man's housework time fails to increase at the same rate that woman's housework time 
decreases, which causes the specialization ratio to remain fairly constant. These findings 
already point to social norms that dictate the household division of labor. The results in Table 6 
cannot be interpreted causally. The variation that we observe in Table 6 might to be due to 
either household or individual heterogeneity (for instance, women that earn more than their 
husbands might have higher standards of household production, i.e. higher taste for household 
produced goods, which might explain why they do relatively more housework than lower 
relative earning women). Table 7 presents conditional results to see if the relationship between 
household specialization and relative earnings observed in Table 6 still holds after household 
and individual observed heterogeneity is controlled for. 
 
Table 6 
Housework, paid labor and relative earnings 
   Husband  Wife  Ratio  Obs. 
 
Net monthly earnings  Daily minutes of housework 
  Wife earns less than husband  82.36  228.53  0.76  1017 
   (98.96)  (126.39)  (0.22) 
  Wife earns the same as husband  92.30  204.33  0.71  792 
   (101.85)  (124.39)  (0.25) 
  Wife earns more than husband  86.90  188.57  0.68  199 
   (84.11)  (112.67)  (0.24) 
 
   Daily minutes of paidwork 
  Wife earns less than husband  406.97  310.42  0.43  1017 
   (245.89)  (208.94)  (0.22) 
  Wife earns the same as husband  390.49  331.38  0.46  792 
   (246.55)  (214.66)  (0.21) 
  Wife earns more than husband  406.47  334.33  0.45  199 
   (221.55)  (196.55)  (0.18) 
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The first column in Table 7 is, except for the fact that we are also controlling for whether it is a 
week-day or a weekend, the mirror image of the third column in Table 6, i.e. it shows the 
unconditional results of the variation in housework specialization and relative earnings. The 
rest of the columns in Table 7 present different specifications of Equation 1 to take into account 
several sources of household and individual heterogeneity. The main results do not change 
substantially across specifications. Table 7 shows that a wife that earns the same as her 
husband has a housework share of 5 percentage points lower than a wife that earns less than 
her husband. The magnitude of the decline is independent of the specification used. Similarly, 
Column 1 in Table 7 shows that a wife that earns more than her husband has a housework 
share of 10 percentage points lower than a wife that earns less than her husband. The size of 
the coefficient decreases to about 7.7 once household incomes and spouse’s education are both 
controlled, but remains at 7.7 even after controlling for heterogeneity in household production 
and preferences. Although a few percentage points in the specialization ration might come 
across as a small variation, Table 6 shows that they might represent an important amount of a 
woman's time (up to three hours a week). 
The results presented in Table 7 might seem consistent with competitive or bargaining theories 
of the household at first, but a closer look provides some support to the social norm theories 
presented here. First, higher earning women are not able to reduce their participation in 
housework activities at the same rate as lower earning women. Whereas women earning the 
same as their husbands reduce their housework share by 5 percentage points with respect to 
women earning less than their husbands, the additional decrease for women earning more than 
their husbands is only 3.5 percentage points (in most specifications). Second, although both ß0 
and ß1 are negative and significantly different from each other, once we introduce the variables 
that control for spouses' age (from specification 3 through 6) we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that ß0 and ß1 are significantly different from each other. The last row of Table 7 shows that a 
Wald test for the null hypothesis that ß0 = ß1 cannot be rejected at the 90% level. Therefore, the 
fact that a woman's share of housework time fails to decrease once a wife's relative earnings 
are higher than her husband's provides some evidence for the existence of social norms or 
constraints on the household allocation of housework time. 
The rest of the coefficients exhibit the expected signs. The coefficient on family income is 
negative although not always significant, especially after controlling for the spouses' education 
attainment. This is likely so because household income might be capturing the effect of 
education, in fact those households with income greater than 3000 euros, a 22% of the sample, 
are also those households were both spouses have the highest education attainment. The role of 
education is as expected, the higher the wife's as well as the husband's level of education, the 
lower the participation of the wife on total housework. However, the coefficients, although 
significant, turn out to be quite small. Regarding age, wife's as well as husband's age seem to 
have a positive effect on the proportion of housework carried out by the wife. However, the size 
of the coefficient is very small and it is only significant in the case of the wives. Finally, 
whereas the number of members in the household and being a weekday increases the wife's 
share of housework, having a paid housekeeper seems to decrease the wife's share of housework 
but the coefficient is not significant. 
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Table 7 
The division of housework  
Wife's share of housework time  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  wife earns same as husband  -0.05586  -0.05977  -0.05986  -0.052  -0.051  -0.050 
    (3.90)*** (4.17)*** (4.24)*** (3.63)*** (3.60)***  (3.59)*** 
  wife earns more than husband  -0.10633  -0.10156  -0.09170  -0.076  -0.078  -0.077 
    (4.64)*** (4.43)*** (4.06)*** (3.29)*** (3.39)***  (3.36)*** 
  household income between 1500 and 3000 E    -0.06158  -0.07514  -0.051  -0.039  -0.039 
      (3.32)*** (4.10)*** (2.75)*** (2.05)**  (2.02)** 
  household income higher than 3000 E    -0.03025  -0.07756  -0.015  0.002  -0.006 
      (1.39) (3.50)*** (0.59)  (0.07) (0.25) 
 wife's  age      0.00368  0.004  0.004  0.003 
        (1.75)* (1.70)* (1.89)*  (1.66)* 
 husband's  age      0.00349  0.002  0.002  0.001 
       (1.77)*  (1.10)  (0.81)  (0.55) 
  wife's years of education        -0.006  -0.006  -0.005
         (2.63)*** (2.55)**  (1.94)* 
  husband's years of education        -0.007  -0.007  -0.007 
         (2.93)***  (3.01)***  (2.91)*** 
  region  dummies       yes  yes 
  
  paid  housekeeper        -0.037 
          ( 1 . 3 4 )  
  number of members in the household            0.038 
          (5.29)*** 
  househald  technology  dummies        yes 
  
  housework  outsourcing  dummies        yes 
  
 week-day  observation  0.09751 0.09664 0.10181  0.105  0.107  0.111 
    (6.61)*** (6.57)*** (7.02)*** (7.28)*** (7.48)***  (7.81)*** 
 constant  0.73634 0.78176 0.50257  0.666  0.696  0.634 
    (52.57)*** (37.60)  *** (13.15)*** (14.02)***(13.72)***(10.76)*** 
Observations  2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008  2,008 
R-squared  0.037 0.043 0.082 0.100 0.121  0.144 
p>F  b0=b1  0.03 0.08 0.17 0.30 0.25  0.28 
Tobit estimates (all sample) 
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; ***1% 
One factor that might be causing the observed flat pattern of household specialization as the 
wife's relative earnings increase might be the fact that our indicators for relative earnings 
might not be measuring the same variation in relative earnings. In fact, the average difference 
between a husband and a wife's earnings is of 764.99 euros if the wife earns less than her 
husband but goes down to -690.95 if the wife earns more than her husband. Therefore the size 
of the change from earning less than her husbands to earning the same as her husband is 
slightly bigger (although statistically significant) than the size of the change from earning the 
same to earning more than her husband. In order to account for this potential bias we construct 
a wider range of relative earnings indicators. Results, are robust to these specifications and 
earning more than a husband, although significantly different from 0, does not imply any 
additional reduction in the wife's share of housework time with respect to a woman earning the 
same as her husband.
14 
                                              
14 These specifications have 5 indicator variables to measure spouses relative earnings rather than 3: A woman earns 
more than 500 euros less than her husband, a woman earns no more than 500 euros less than her husband, a woman 
earns the same than her husband, a woman earns no more than 500 euros more than her husband and a woman 
earns more than 500 euros more than her husband. 
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One of the coefficients in Table 7 that is significant in all specification is the indicator variable 
of whether it is a weekday or a weekend day. Table 3 in Section 2 showed that most housework 
activities must be performed weekly, with 99% of women do some housework during the week. 
Also because there are no labor market obligations during the weekend, spare time is greater 
during the weekend than during week days. Thus, we would expect that spouses are able to 
make intertemporal substitutions of housework and postpone some housework time during 
week days, when the time constraint that households face is more likely to bind, to be done 
during the weekend. It could be argued that this substitution is particularly important for 
women whose earnings are higher than their husbands because these women might have more 
demanding jobs. Pooling both samples together, the sample of the week days and weekends, 
might then produce the artificial result of constant patterns of relative housework for all 
women independent of their relative earnings. In order to tackle this question we divide the 
sample and estimate Equation 1 over two separate subsamples: the subsample of couples who 
filled out the diary on a week-day and the subsample of couples who filled out the diary on a 
weekend-day. 
The first 6 columns in Table 8 shows, that during the week the same conclusion as in Table 7 
follows. During week days women earning more than their husbands seem to reduce the 
r e l a t i v e  s h a r e  o f  h o u s e w o r k  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  w o m e n  t h a t  e a r n  t h e  s a m e  o r  l e s s  t h a n  t h e i r  
husbands (ß1 = -0.8 according to specification 6). However, as in the pooled sample, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that ß0 and ß1, are significantly different from each other. The last row of 
Table 8 shows that a Wald test for the null hypothesis that ß0 = ß1 cannot be rejected at the 
90% level. Thus a woman's share of housework time during week days fails to decrease with 
relative earnings once a wife's relative earnings are equal to her husband's. On the other hand, 
during the weekend household specialization not only does not decrease with relative earnings, 
it actually increases. Although a woman that earns the same as her husband has a 
specialization ratio that is .07 percentage points lower than a woman that earns less than her 
husband, a woman that earns more than her husband only reduces her share by .01 more. Once 
we control for education and other household and individual observable heterogeneity the 
coefficient on the indicator variable is not significantly different from zero. This would suggest 
that higher relative earning women would actually increase their housework share during the 
weekend with respect to equal relative earning women, which would go in line with the 
doing-gender hypothesis.
15 
                                              
15 One must be cautious when interpreting this result given that there are very few women with earnings higher than 
their husbands in our weekend sample.  
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Table 8 
The division of housework, week vs. weekend 
 Wife’s share of housework time  Week  Week-end 
  (1)  (2) C3) (4) (5)  (6) (1) (2) C3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  wife earns same as husband  -0.04511  -0.04840  -0.05001  -0.042  -0.041  -0.039  -0.07997 -0.08465 -0.08056  -0.071  -0.070  -0.073 
    (2.57)** (2.  75)*** (2.87)*** (2.41)**  (2.33)**  (2.27)**  (3.24)*** (3.45)*** (3.37)*** (2.94)*** (2.95)*** (3.03)** 
  wife earns more than husband  -0.11133  -0.10967  -0.09829  -0.084  -0.082  -0.078  -0.08683 -0.007306 -0.06992  -0.048  -0.042  -0.03989 













  household income between 1500 and 3000 E    -0.04977  -0.06223  -0.037 -0.026 -0.024    -0.09031  -0.10589  -0.085 -0.075 -0.083 











  household income higher than 3000 E    -0.01613  -0.06175  0.005 0.019 0.006    -0.06161  -0.11191  -0.057  -0.049  -0.051 









  (1.19) 
  wife's  age     0.00311  0.003  0.003  0.002     0.00515  0.005  0.005  0.005 




    (1.33)
  (1.24)
  (1.37)
  (1.21) 
  husband's  age     0.00348  0.002  0.002  0.001     0.00335  0.002  0.002  0.003 
         (1.47)
  (0.86)
   (0.68)
  (0.30)




  (0.78) 
  wife's years of education        -0.006  -0.006  -0.005      -0.007  -0.006  -0.005 
         (1.95)
*  (1.96)
**  (1.63)
    
  (1.92)
*  (1.71)
*  (1.23) 
  husband's years of education        -0.008  -0.009  -0.008      -0.004  -0.002  -0.00182 




***    
  (1.02)
  (0.66)
  (0.48) 
  region  dummies       yes  yes       yes  yes 
 
  paid  housekeeper        -0.041        -0.039 
          ( 1 . 2 2 )         ( 0 . 8 1 )  
  number  of  members  in  the  household       0.050        0.015 
          (5.54)***        (1.25) 
  household  technology  dummies        yes        yes 
 
  housework  outsourcing  dummies        yes        yes 
 
 constant  0.83158  0.86599  0.61399  0.791 0.812 0.755  0.74256 0.81193 0.47945  0.624  0.661  0.615 
    (70.73)*** (39.34)*** (13.90)*** (13.84)*** (13.23)*** (10.45)*** (45.36)*** (25.98)***  (7.47)***  (7.93)***  (8.02)***  (6.47)*** 
Observations 1420  1420  1420  1420  1420  1420  588 588 588 588 588 588 
R  squared  0.014 0.018 0.049 0.067 0.092 0.127 0.025 0.042 0.114 0.134 0.198 0.215 
p>F  b0=b1  0.02 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.88 0.80 0.81 0.60 0.52 0.46 
Tobit estimates (all sample) 
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; ***1% 
 
The results presented in this section follow through when the dependent variable is 
specialization in female-specific household activities (such as cleaning, cooking, ironing, 
shopping and traveling). These households activities are done routinely and are more likely to 
be considered as housework than male-specific activities such as gardening, which is done 
sporadically and might have a higher consumption component. Comparison of male and female 
specific activities is however not possible due to the drop in sample sizes for those activities 
commonly performed by men.
16 
 
4.2. Social Norms and the Allocation of Childcare Time 
Our analysis has been focused now on childcare. Conceptualizing childcare as housework is 
difficult. Unlike housework, time devoted to childcare might produce direct utility (even at the 
margin), being conceptually closer to leisure. In fact Table 9 shows that women devote more 
time to Childcare 1 and Childcare 2 as female relative earnings increase, which suggests that 
the conceptualization of childcare as housework might be more subtle than it might appear at 
first. If childcare time is closer to be conceptualized as leisure than housework it would not be 
surprising that as a woman's relative earnings increase she is able to either negotiate more of 
this good (in line with bargaining theories). This story however is not quite clear for men, 
whose childcare increases as well over the entire relative earnings distribution. There might also 
be substitution and income effects associated to childcare, so that as female relative earnings go 
up total income in the household goes up and both spouses could in principle enjoy more 
leisure (a normal good) and in this particular case, more childcare. The picture for Childcare 3 is 
slightly different because it displays a U-shape pattern, e.g. it decreases as a woman goes from 
                                              
16 Results available upon request.  
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earning less to earning the same as her husband, but increases again as she earns more than 
him. This pattern might be explained by the fact that the nature of childcare that the woman 
performs changes with her relative earnings. 
 
Based on the primary activity that the adult is doing in the presence of a child, diary data 
a l l o w s  u s  t o  m a k e  s o m e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  childcare that might be conceptualized as 
housework because it can be easily outsourced or no direct utility is derived (for example, 
picking children up from school) and which childcare entails leisure (for example, playing with 
a child). We construct two variables childcare-routine and childcare-leisure. The variable 
childcare-leisure is constructed as the sum of any time devoted leisure activities (including 
playing with children) reported as a primary activities in the performed in the company of a 
child under 10 years old. We construct childcare-routine as the sum of any time devoted to 
childcare reported as primary or secondary activity (except playing with a child) and any other 
primary activity that is considered to be non-leisure activities (cleaning, shopping, eating, etc.) 
as long as they are performed in the company of a child under 10 years old.
17 Obviously this 
method has many drawbacks. Leisure activities perform with a child might not be as pleasant as 
leisure activities perform with adults. The data can inform on this to some extent. 
 
Table 9 shows how childcare changes with relative earnings. We observe that in the case of the 
three broad definitions of childcare (Childeare 1 through Childcare 3) the ratio is fairly constant, 
but the variations of woman and man's absolute childcare times make it evident that one cannot 
infer whether childcare is leisure or housework, as absolute childcare time increases with relative 
earnings for both spouses. However, when we divide Childcare 3 into childcare-routine and 
childcare-leisure we observe that the absolute time devoted to childcare-routine decreases for 
women and increases for men as female relative earnings go up. In the case of childcare-leisure it 
increases for both men and women as relative earnings go up. These two findings suggest that 
our definition of childcare routine is likely to be capturing childcare activities that are 
conceptually closer to housework than leisure. Again, as in the case of Table 6, the ratios 
presented on Table 9 refer to unconditional variations of childcare as female relative earnings 
increase might be subject to household or individual heterogeneity. For instance, women that 
earn more than their husbands might have higher standards of childcare, maybe because of their 
higher education attainment. This might explain why they failed to decrease the proportion of 
childcare they do in relation to lower relative earning women. 
                                              
17 Table A.3 in Appendix C shows which primary activities we are defining as leisure and which we are defining as 
non leisure activities. We have constructed different definitions of childcare leisure and childcare routine, including 
or excluding secondary childcare and changing the classification. Results are robust to these different specifications 
and are available upon request.  
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Table 9 
Childcare and relative earnings 
   Husband  Wife  Ratio  Obs. 
    Daily minutes of childcare 1 
Wife earns less than husband  66.65  124.80  0.68  356 
   (77.51)  (100.77)  (0.27) 
Wife earns the same as husband  75.15  130.42  0.66  308 
   (81.92)  (109.41)  (0.27) 
Wife earns more than husband  88.67  135.03  0.67  72 
   (95.36)  (99.30)  (0.26) 
    Daily minutes of childcare 2 
Wife earns less than husband  75.10  138.62  0.68  356 
   (88.07)  (109.83)  (0.27) 
Wife earns the same as husband  86.91  143.59  0.65  308 
   (98.85)  (122.52)  (0.28) 
Wife earns more than husband  95.91  161.66  0.69  72 
   (100.59)  (126.20)  (0.25) 
    Daily minutes of childcare 3 
Wife earns less than husband  254.52  370.34  0.62  356 
   (219.18)  (224.97)  (0.19) 
Wife earns the same as husband  247.21  358.35  0.62  308 
   (208.03)  (204.70)  (0.19) 
Wife earns more than husband  260.71  362.39  0.64  72 
 
   Minutes  of  childcare-routine 
Wife earns less than husband  156.55  292.75  0.67  356 
   (139.27)  (185.35)  (0.20) 
Wife earns the same as husband  162.11  278.14  0.65  308 
   (137.30)  (165.39)  (0.19) 
Wife earns more than husband  163.56  276.71  0.67  72 
   (152.49)    (164.96)  (0.21) 
   Minutes  of  childcar-leisure 
Wife earns less than husband  97.45  75.86  0.44  356 
   (115.22)  (93.86)  (0.31) 
Wife earns the same as husband  84.76  79.62  0.54  308 
   (109.97)  (99.41)  (0.34) 
Wife earns more than husband  96.97  80.83  0.47  72 
   (116.11)  (91.75)  (0.29) 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. Variables of childcare only constructed for households with children 
under 10 years old. 
 
Table 10 shows the results for the spouses' division of housework and childcare for households 
with children under 10 years old. Regarding housework, women earning more than their 
husbands do relatively more housework than those women earning the same than their 
husbands. I.e. as reported in Table 8 with respect to housework performed during the weekends, 
specialization within the household actually increases, and not decreases, with women's relative 
earnings. This again is consistent with the doing gender hypothesis.
18 
Turning to childcare we observe that the relative amount of time that spouses devote to routine 
childcare activities varies with respect to the wife's relative earnings. In fact, out of all 
explanatory variables used in the analysis only the wife's education and the number of 
members in the household seem to have some explanatory power. 
 
                                              
18 However, as in the pooled sample, we cannot reject the hypothesis that ß0 and ß1 are significantly different from 
each other. The last row of Table 10 shows that a Wald test for the null hypotehesis that ß0 = ß1 cannot be rejected 
at the 90% level.  
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These results are not likely to be due to small sample sizes (indeed, the regression results 
regarding housework specialization is very similar to those obtained when the sample of 
parents and non-parents was used). However, these results could be due to our definition of 
childcare-routine if we have failed to capture childcare conceptually closer to housework in our 
definition. We have constructed different definitions of childcare leisure and childcare routine, 
including or excluding secondary childcare and changing the classification. Results are robust 
to these different specifications. We have also used the sample of parents of the under-5 and 
also consider the samples of week and weekend separately. Results are virtually the same.
19 
Table 10 
Housework, childcare and relative earnings 
Wife's share of housework and childcare time   Housework      Childcare routine 
    (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
wife earns same as husband  -0.100  -0.01306  -0.01492  -0.01416  -0.00435  -0.00513 -0.00477 
  (4.68)***  (0.78) (0.89) (0.84) (0.26) (0.30)  (0.28) 
wife  earns  more  than  husband  -0.084  0.00122 0.00402 0.00454 0.01683 0.01633  0.01595 
  (2.28)**  (0.04) (0.14) (0.16) (0.58) (0.55)  (0.54) 
household income between 1500 and 3000 E  -0.035    -0.01899  -0.02036  0.00554  0.00705  0.013 
  (1.22)    (0.89) (0.95) (0.25) (0.32)  (0.55) 
household income higher than 3000 E  0.024    -0.02259  -0.02563  0.03715  0.04323  0.045 
  (0.60)    (0.88) (0.97) (1.24) (1.42)  (1.43) 
wife's  age  -0.009      0.00199 0.00246 0.00259 0.001 
  (2.34)**      (0.70) (0.88) (0.92)  (0.48) 
husbands  age  0.001      -0.00168 -0.00212 -0.00236 -0.003 
  (0.48)    (0.69)  (0.88)  (0.97)  (1.31) 
wife's years of education  -0.001        -0.00896  -0.00924  -0.008 
 (0.36)        (3.21)***  (3.27)***  (2.70)*** 
husbands years of education  -0.001        -0.00255  -0.00253  -0.001 
  (0.41)      (0.95)  (0.94)  (0.46) 
paid  housekeeper  -0.039        -0.006 
  (1.16)        (0.24) 
region  dummies  yes       yes  yes 
 
number of members in the household  0.090            0.031 
  (4.22)***        (1.88)* 
household  technology  dummies  yes        yes 
 
housework  outsourcing  dummies  yes        yes 
 
Number of children under 15  -0.036            -0.011 
  (1.39)        (0.56) 
children under 4 years-old dummy  -0.055            -0.011 
  (3.04)***        (0.74) 
week-day  observation  0.098  0.10725 0.10723 0.10767 0.10668 0.10744  0.10746 
 (4.50)***  (6.15)***  (6-14)***  (6.16)*** (6.18)*** (6.22)***  (6.18)*** 
constant  0.795  0.59707 0.61381 0.60688 0.71037 0.71571  0.69268 
   (6.72)***  (35.84)***  (25.30)***  (9.12)*** (10.13)*** (9.88)***  (7.41)*** 
Observations  736 721 721 721 721 721 721 
R-squared  0.198 0.302 0.309 0.314 0.467 0.558  0.674 
p>F  bO=b  1  0.51 0.63 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.48  0.49 
Tobit estimates (sample of parents of children under 10) 
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; -*1% 
                                              
19 Available upon request.  
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4.3. Interpreting the Results 
The results presented herein have provided some evidence of social norms associated to the 
household division of labor. Consistent with other studies, our findings suggest that a woman's 
relative share of housework and childcare does not change with the spouses' relative earnings. 
This Section provides alternative explanations to this empirical regularity based on systematic 
differences in household production and tastes between women who earn more than their 
husbands and women who earn less. Ideally the use of panel data would solve these concerns 
as long as the heterogeneity is constant over time. However, to our knowledge, there is no 
recent panel data, that is a diary, and interview both members of the household. The last part of 
this section provides a possible interpretation of the results in light of social norms. 
First, one might argue that women that earn more than their husbands might be less productive 
at home. Thus, keeping everything else constant, higher relative earning women might devote 
more time to housework in order to get the same output than women that earn less than their 
husbands. Although our specifications control for household production by including measures 
of household technology (such as the presence of a microwave) and household outsourcing 
(such as any helped received) these variables are imperfect measures and some unobserved 
heterogeneity with respect to women's productivity might not be accounted for. There is, 
however, big evidence in the literature that shows that more productive women in the market 
are also more productive at home, specially in childcare. 
An alternative explanation consistent with our findings would be that women that earn more 
than their husbands have, everything else equal, a stronger taste for household produced goods 
and childcare than women that earn less than their husbands. Whereas we have tried to control 
for this heterogeneity in preferences using woman's education and age, there might still be 
some heterogeneity in tastes that is not accounted for. 
Finally, another plausible explanation might have to do with the matching mechanism in the 
marriage market. It might be that women whose earnings are higher than their husbands marry 
to men that either have a higher taste for household produced goods and childcare, or that are 
less productive at doing housework or childcare. Under this scenario, and considering 
everything else constant including the total household produced output, women with higher 
relative earnings will have to compensate by doing a higher share of housework than women 
with relative lower earnings. We try to tackle this potential problem by controlling for 
husband's characteristics but this might still leave out some unobserved heterogeneity. 
We could venture that the results obtained herein seem consistent with social norms 
characterized by an upper (lower) limit to the amount of housework that a man (woman) should 
do in a household. These social norms might become binding when commitment failures 
associated to the division of household labor exist. The literature has long recognized the 
presence of limited commitment problems within the household that may arise as a result of a 
couple's inability to either reach binding, legally-enforceable agreements about future behavior 
because of the non-observability by third parties (see (Basu, 2004) and (Rasul, 2002)) or to 
fulfill informal contracts because of the lack of credible threats, specially in caring activities 
(Folbre and Bittman, 2004). Although inefficient outcomes due to commitment failures seem 
plausible for decisions that arise repeatedly, such as situations in which "taking turns" is 
possible, even for repeated decisions economic theory offers no presumption of efficiency 
(Pollak, 2006). Imperfect commitment is usually characterized as the inability of one spouse to 
make transfers of private consumption to compensate the other partner for utility losses  
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(Lundberg and Pollak, 2001). In this paper we have focused on the inability of partners to 
credibly commit to make transfers of time (leisure), rather than money. 
5. Conclusion 
The results presented in this paper have provided some evidence of social norms associated to 
the household division of labor. Economic theories of the household predict that increases in 
female human capital lead to increases in female labor force participation and, symmetrically, 
to decreases in the female time devoted to household production. We use the Spanish Time Use 
data 2002 to explore the nonlinearities associated to the division of housework. 
Consistent with other studies, our findings suggest that a woman's relative share of housework 
and childcare does not change with the spouses' relative earnings. Moreover, during weekends, 
and for the sample of parents the relative amount of housework done by women who earn 
more than their husbands is higher than the relative amount of housework done by women who 
earn less than their husbands. This means that household specialization is actually increasing, 
not decreasing, with a woman's relative earnings. These findings are robust to different 
specifications of the regression equation, the sample used or the definition of housework and 
childcare. 
We have interpreted our results as consistent with the theories of social norms and gender roles 
associated to the household division of labor. Although it is beyond of this paper to address 
how these social norms are formed, investigating how social norms that govern the allocation 
of family time are formed and sustained over time is certainly a topic worth pursuing in future 
research.  
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A. Description of Housework Categories 
 
Table A.1. 
Classification of activities in STUS 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES IN THE SPANISH TIME USE SURVEY 
 
ACTIVITIES CODES 
PERSONAL CARE  >=0 & <=390 
  Sleep  >=100 & <200 
  Food and drink  >=200 & <300 
  Other personal care  >=300 & <=390 
WORK   >=1000 & <=1390 
  Main job  >=1100 & <1200 
  Secondary job  >=1200 & <1300 
  Activities related to work  >=1300 & <1390 
STUDIES  >=2000 & <2210 
  From school to college  >=2100 & <2200 
  Studies during free time  >=2200 & <=2210 
HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY  >=3000 & <=3910 
  Cooking activities  >=3100 & <3200 
  Household maintenance  >=3200 & c3300 
  Clothes caring  >=3300 & <3400 
  Gardening and pets  >=3400 & <3500 
  Construction and repairs  >=3500 & <3600 
  Shopping and services  >=3600 & <3700 
  Household management  >=3700 & <3800 
 Childcare  >=3800  &<3900 
  Playing  with  children  ==3830 
    Basic childcare  (>3800 & <=3820) | (>=3840 & <3900) 
  Help to adult member  >=3900 & <=3910 
VOLUNTARY WORK AND MEETINGS  >=4000 & <=4390 
  For an organization  >=4100 & <4200 
  Informal help to other households  >=4200 & <4300 
  Participative activities  >=4300 & <=4390 
SOCIAL LIFE AND RECREATION  >=5000 & <=5310 
  Social life  >=5100 & <5200 
  Recreation and culture  >=5200 & <5300 
  Passive leisure  >=5300 & <=5310 
SPORTS AND OUTDOOR ACTIVITIES  >=6000 & <=6310 
  Physical training  >=6100 & <6200 
  Productive training  >=6200 & <6300 
  Activities related to sports  >=6300 & <=6310 
HOBBIES AND GAMES  >=7000 & <=7390 
  Artistic hobbies  >=7100 & <7200 
  Hobbies  >=7200 & <7300 
  Games  >=7300 & <=7390 
COMUNICATION MEDIA  >=8000 & <=8320 
  Reading  >=8100 & <8200 
  TV and video  >=8200 & <8300 
  Radio and music  >=8300 & <=8320 
RIDES AND NO SPECIFIC TIME USE  >=9000 & <=990 
  Rides with an objective  >=9000 & <9820 
 Pleasure  driving  ==9820 
  Auxiliary codes  >=9900 &<=9990 
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B Activities in the presence of children under 10 
 
Table B.1.  
Activities with children under 10 
 
 Husband  Wife 
Activity  % Mean  Mean  % Mean  Mean 
   (fraction  (whole  (fraction  (whole 
   who  report  sample)  who  report  sample) 
   time>0)    time>0) 
Personal  Care  72.25% 75.93 54.86  82.91%  79.85  66.21 
Work 2.87%  80.01  2.30  4.08%  102.72  4.19 
Studies 0.86%  75.28  0.65  0.43%  18.93  0.08 
Household and Family  71.89%  115.88  83.30  92.15%  189.78  174.88 
Voluntary  Work  and  Meetings  1.82% 1.37 0.02  2.43%  1.07  0.03 
Social Life and Recreation  33.01%  83.95  27.71  39.46%  71.24  28.11 
Sports and Outdoor Activities  18.55%  85.19  15.80  20.90%  74.20  15.51 
Hobbies and Games  2.76%  67.13  1.85  1.52%  62.31  0.95 
Communication and Media  37.60%  78.87  29.66  27.75%  68.23  18.93 
Travel and Unspecified Time Use  49.84%  45.65  22.75  70.52%  47.84  33.74 
Sample: Parents with children younger than 10 
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C. Conceptualization of Childcare as housework 
 
Table C.1. 
Conceptualization of childcare 
  
 Husband      Wife 
Activity  Type % Mean  Mean % Mean  Mean 
     (fraction  (whole    (fraction  (whole 
      who report  sample)    who report  sample) 
     time>0)    time>0) 
PERSONAL CARE  R  72.25%  75.93  54.86  82.91%  79.85  66.21 
 Sleep  R  3.81%  165.90  6.32 5.77%  113.42  6.54 
  Food and drink  R  69.42%  64.11  44.51  80.23%  65.76  52.76 
 Other  personal  care  R  18.95% 21.24  4.03  28.03% 24.63  6.90 
WORK R  2.87%  80.01  2.30  4.08%  102.72  4.19 
 Main  job  R  1.61% 83.97  1.35 3.28%  110.58  3.63 
 Secondary  job  R  0.64%  122.59  0.78 0.29%  120.00  0.35 
  Activities related to work  R  0.62%  25.90  0.16  0.58%  50.70  0.29 
STUDIES R  0.86%  75.28  0.65  0.43%  18.93  0.08 
  From school to college  R  0.00%  0.00  0.00  0.37%  10.00  0.04 
  Studies during free time  R  0.86%  75.28  0.65  0.06%  70.00  0.04 
HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY    71.89%  115.88  83.30  92.15%  189.78  174.88 
 Cooking  activities  R  36.56% 32.38 11.84  66.73% 50.91 33.97 
 Household  maintenance  R  14.33% 39.49  5.66  39.12% 45.25 17.70 
 Clothes  caring  R  2.84% 17.82  0.51  20.93% 44.26  9.26 
  Gardening and pets  L  2.49%  64.13  1.60  2.05%  37.14  0.76 
  Construction and repairs  R  1.23%  51.98  0.64  1.26%  27.13  0.34 
 Shopping  and  services  R  12.85% 54.05  6.94  26.14% 54.86 14.34 
 Household  management  R  0.24% 18.51  0.04 0.59% 17.60  0.10 
 Childcare    62.33% 86.10 53.66  83.82%  113.05 94.76 
    Playing with children  L  27.70%  55.98  15.51  27.60%  52.33  14.44 
  Basic  childcare  R  57.22% 66.68 38.16  82.11% 97.80 80.31 
  Help to adult members  R  0.88%  70.55  0.62  0.56%  15.23  0.09 
VOLUNTARY WORK AND MEETING:  R  1.82%  1.37  0.02  2.43%  1.07  0.03 
  For an organization  R  0.00%  0.00  0.00  0.00%  0.00  0.00 
  Informal help to other households  R  0.55%  62.88  0.35  1.51%  36.42  0.55 
 Participative  activities  R  1.28% 53.33  0.68 0.92% 51.37  0.47 
SOCIAL LIFE AND RECREATION    33.01%  83.95  27.71  39.46%  71.24  29.11 
 Social  life  L  22.43% 68.55 15.37  28.84% 59.80 17.25 
 Recreation  and  culture  L  2.51% 86.80  2.18 2.48% 82.33  2.04 
 Passive  leisure  L  10.46% 84.09  8.80  13.28% 66.45  8.82 
SPORTS AND OUTDOOR ACTIVITIES    18.55%  85.19  15.80  20.90%  74.20  15.51 
 Physical  training  L  18.09% 84.98 15.37  20.49% 74.75 15.32 
 Productive  training  L  0.06%  150.00  0.09 0.06%  150.00  0.09 
  Activities related to sports  L  0.00%  0.00  0.00  0.36%  29.32  0.11 
HOBBIES AND GAMES    2.76%  67.13  1.85  1.52%  62.31  0.95 
 Artistic  hobbies  R  0.03%  120.00  0.04 0.00%  0.00  0.00 
 Hobbies  R  1.95% 60.80  1.19 0.94% 52.50  0.49 
 Games  L  0.91% 69.58  0.63 0.59% 77.97  0.46 
COMUNICATION MEDIA    37.60%  78.87  29.66  27.75%  68.23  18.93 
 Reading  R  3.20% 39.98  1.28 3.40% 46.72  1.59 
  TV and video  L  35.29%  79.68  28.12  25.92%  66.51  17.24 
 Radio  and  music  R  0.88% 29.40  0.26 0.12% 92.26  0.11 
RIDES AND NO SPECIFIC TIME USE    49.84%  45.65  22.75  70.52%  47.84  33.74 
  Rides with an objective  R  49.46%  44.54  22.03  70.40%  47.19  33.22 
 Pleasure  driving  L  0.43% 82.81  0.36 0.15%  114.59  0.17 
 Auxiliary  codes  R  1.23% 29.95  0.37 0.96% 34.91  0.34 
Sample: Parents with children younger than 10 
 
 